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RENEWED EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
John T. Hood, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The legal profession has been subjected to more public criticism
during the past decade than has occurred at any other time during
this century. Most of the criticism is leveled at the increasing number
of lawyers who have failed to measure up to the standards of integrity
expected of them, the organized bar's failure to discipline its mem-
bers, and the bar's failure to provide legal services for many needy
Americans.
The American Bar Association, aware of this growing criticism,
appointed a Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary En-
forcement in 1967, the purpose of the committee being to study griev-
ance procedures in the states, with the view of recommending im-
proved methods of assuring observance of professional standards. The
Honorable Tom C. Clark, former Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, served as Chairman of that committee. After
studying these problems for three years, the committee submitted its
report entitled Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary
Enforcement. The report was approved by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association in August, 1970.
The disciplinary deficiencies in the profession which were re-
ported by the Clark Committee have been magnified in the public
mind by the involvement of several prominent lawyers in recent polit-
ical scandals. The fact that most of the improprieties attributed to
those attorneys were committed in their non-professional capacities
has not mitigated the damage which all lawyers suffered as a result
of the adverse publicity. Attorneys have always been subject to cen-
sure for improper acts committed within and without the scope of
their professional duties, and it is normal for the public to expect
them to conduct themselves ethically at all times.
The 1970 report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Dis-
ciplinary Enforcement began with a statement that a "scandalous
situation" existed which required the immediate attention of the
profession.2 The committee found that many attorneys were hostile
*Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana. The author acknowl-
edges his indebtedness to Mr. Kenneth R. Williams, a member of the Lake Charles
bar, for research and editorial assistance in preparing this paper.
1. 95 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR Ass'N 783 (1970).
2. Id. at 797.
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or apathetic to disciplinary enforcement, and it noted that in many
jurisdictions, procedures for enforcing professional standards were
antiquated and were totally ineffective. The committee identified
thirty-six major disciplinary problems, including inadequately fi-
nanced and understaffed disciplinary agencies, the reluctance of
agencies to initiate large scale investigations of professional conduct
in the absence of specific complaints, the failure of local agencies to
take steps to remove incapacitated attorneys from practice prior to
evidence of their misconduct, and the reluctance of attorneys and
judges to report professional misconduct.3
The Clark Report provided impetus for the creation of the ABA's
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and the Associ-
ation's Center for Professional Discipline. The function of the last
mentioned body is to work under and with the Standing Committee
on Professional Responsibility "to develop new ideas, to foster con-
cern and reform in place of apathy and to inform the state and local
leaders responsible for day to day disciplinary enforcement." Its pri-
mary goal is to encourage investigations and disciplinary complaints
and the filing of charges and enforcement of discipline where war-
ranted.
The problem of making legal services available for all persons
who need such services has been rendered more acute by recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court which make it necessary
for legal assistance to be provided in some cases where previously it
was not necessary to do so.' The problem persists despite the in-
creased number of recent law school graduates. Various methods of
providing such services have been suggested, and in many instances
plans designed to provide the needed legal services have been imple-
mented.
The Code of Professional Responsibility,5 adopted by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1969, represents a major effort on the part of
that association to solve these problems and to eliminate some of the
criticism which is directed toward the legal profession. The most
notable feature of the new Code of Professional Responsibility is that
it contains mandatory disciplinary rules which prohibit specific acts
or conduct by members of the bar and it provides for disbarment or
disciplinary action in the event those rules are violated. The new
Code was designed primarily to cure the disciplinary ills of the profes-
3. Id. at 815-987.
4. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
5. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. The ABA CODE, as adopted by
Louisiana, is found in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XVI,
LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app. (Supp. 1971).
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sion. It has been criticized, however, for failing to deal with the prob-
lem of making legal services readily accessible to all persons who need
them.
Any long range program designed to maintain high standards of
efficiency and integrity in the legal profession must begin with an
effective means of weeding out those who are not qualified or fit to
practice law, and to admit to the bar only those who are able and are
of good moral character. The program also must include an effective
procedure for disciplining practitioners who do not conform to the
standards of professional responsibility set by the profession.
The purpose of this article is to review briefly some of the juris-
prudence relating to requirements for admission to the bar and to
generally discuss the new Code of Professional Responsibility, focus-
ing on one important disciplinary rule which requires attorneys to
report instances of professional misconduct.
INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT
In almost every American jurisdiction, the regulation and disci-
pline of the legal profession is vested in the judiciary as a part of its
"inherent power." The "inherent power" of a court has been defined
as such authority as is essential to the existence of the court and
necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.,
Attorneys traditionally have been deemed officers of the courts, and
the authority to regulate the practice of law and to supervise and
control the conduct of those who practice in the courts has always
been regarded as one of the essential and necessary powers of the
judiciary.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right,
but it is a privilege or franchise granted by the courts, although courts
may not unreasonably withhold that privilege While the power to
regulate admissions to the bar is vested in state courts, the legislature
of a state can prescribe reasonable rules and regulations relative to
admission which do not conflict with or deprive the judiciary of its
inherent power to control such admissions.'
Incidental to the judiciary's power to regulate admissions to the
6. Bowman v. Comfort Chair Co., 271 N.C. 702, 707, 157 S.E.2d 378, 383 (1967);
Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 619, 27 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1943).
7. Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169
S.E.2d 790 (1969); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15 (1960); Moity v.
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 239 La. 1081, 121 So. 2d 87 (1960).
8. In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d 398 (1942); State v. Rosborough, 152 La.
945, 94 So. 858 (1922); Board of Comm'rs Miss. State Bar v. Collins, 59 So. 2d 361
(Miss. 1952).
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bar is its authority to discipline, suspend and disbar those who have
been admitted to practice. This power, of course, cannot be exercised
unreasonably or arbitrarily by the courts.
The Louisiana supreme court has asserted its inherent power to
supervise the admission and discipline of attorneys on several occa-
sions. In Ex parte Steckler,' for instance, the court said:
It is admitted judicially-almost if not quite univer-
sally-that the prescribing of the ultimate qualifications for ad-
mission to the bar is a judicial function. . . .The inherent power
of the Supreme Court to admit or disbar attorneys at law may
be aided and regulated by statute, but it cannot be thereby frus-
trated or destroyed. .... 10
Most state courts enlist the aid of members of the bar in ascer-
taining the qualifications and fitness of applicants for the practice of
law." In doing so, however, the courts do not surrender or delegate
their inherent power to regulate the practice of law. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana has followed this procedure for many years.
In 1940, the Louisiana legislature specifically recognized the in-
herent power of the Louisiana supreme court to regulate the practice
of law. An act was adopted that year memorializing the supreme
court "to exercise its inherent powers by providing for the organiza-
tion and regulation of the Louisiana State Bar Association; by provid-
ing rules and regulations concerning admissions to the Bar, the con-
duct and activities of the Association and its members; . . .and by
providing for the discipline, suspension or disbarment of its mem-
bers."' 2 Acting pursuant to that memorial, the supreme court organ-
ized the Louisiana State Bar Association by order dated March 12,
1941, and by the same order it made the articles of incorporation of
the association the rules of the court by which the association, as an
agency of the court, is governed. 3 One of the purposes of the associa-
tion, as an agency of the court, is to "regulate the practice of law"
and to "uphold the honor of the courts and of the profession of law."' 4
9. 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934).
10. Id. at 422, 154 So. at 45.
11. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 34-35 (5th ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
DRINKER].
12. La. Acts 1940, No. 54, § 3 (emphasis added).
13. LA. R.S. 37:211 (1950). The Articles of Incorporation appear in the appendix
to Chapter 4 of Title 37 of the Revised Statutes. The articles as amended continue to
function as rules of the supreme court. See LA. SuP. CT. R. 17, 19 following Title 13 of
the Revised Statutes. See also In re Jones, 202 La. 729, 730, 12 So. 2d 795, 796 (1943).
14. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N art. I, § 1, LA. R.S.
37, ch. 4, app. (Supp. 1971).
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The Articles of Incorporation of the State Bar Association have
been amended by the Louisiana supreme court from time to time. In
their present form, Article XIV regulates admissions to the bar, Arti-
cle XV regulates discipline and disbarment of members, and Article
XVI contains the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ADMISSION TO THE BAR
American jurisdictions universally require applicants for admis-
sion to the bar to produce satisfactory proof that they are of good
moral character. Most jurisdictions require as a prerequisite for ad-
mission that applicants be of a certain age, and that they demon-
strate their legal proficiency by graduating from an accredited law
school and passing a state bar examination. In several states, the
right to practice law is restricted to citizens of a state or of the United
States, or to those who have met minimum residency requirements.
In Louisiana, an applicant for admission to the bar must produce
satisfactory evidence that he is: (a) of good moral character; (b)
twenty-one years of age; (c) a citizen of the United States of America;
and (4) a graduate of a law school that is approved by the American
Bar Association. He also must take a bar examination and be certi-
fied to the Louisiana supreme court by the Committee on Bar Admis-
sions as having satisfactorily passed that examination. 5
Good Moral Character
Many courts have undertaken to define "good moral character,"
as that term is used in requirements for admission to the bar. One
typical definition, given by the Supreme Court of Missouri, is "the
character to conform to higher standards of ethical conduct than are
ordinarily considered necessary in business relations which do not
involve the same fiduciary and confidential relations.""6
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the validity of a
requirement by a state court that an applicant be of good moral
character before he can be admitted to the bar. The Court said in
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,7 however, that:
The term, 'good moral character' has long been used as a
qualification for membership in the Bar and has served a useful
purpose in this respect. However the term, by itself, is usually
ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of
15. Id. art XIV, § 7.
16. Curry v. Dahlberg, 341 Mo. 910, 911, 112 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1937).
17. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, expe-
riences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification,
which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections,
can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory
denial of the right to practice law."8
Some courts have indicated that applicants for admission to the
bar may be rejected on grounds that they lack good moral character
for a number of reasons, including the commission of criminal offen-
ses, 9 intemperate or irresponsible conduct, 0 falsifying information in
applications for admission,"' forging certificates of good moral charac-
ter," being a member of the Communist Party,2 refusing to disclose
to bar examining committees information which they felt was mate-
rial in assessing the applicant's character," and allowing another to
take the law school aptitude test for the applicant. 5
18. Id. at 262-63.
19. Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In West, the applicant had been
convicted of mail fraud and received a limited pardon after serving seven years of a
twelve year sentence. The violation occurred while he was a member of the West
Virginia Bar Association. The court held that he could not be admitted to the bar of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See also Application of
Brooks, 355 P.2d 840 (Wash. 1960) (applicant violated Selective Service Act by refus-
ing to report to wartime work camp for conscientious objectors).
20. In re Latimer, 11 Ill. 2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20 (1957).
21. Petition of Bowen, 447 P.2d 658 (Nev. 1969).
22. In re Woodward, 27 Mont. 355, 71 P. 161 (1903). Although this case did not
involve the denial of an applicant's admission to the bar, it indicates that a forged
letter of recommendation or certificate of good moral character would be grounds for
a denial of admission.
23. In Application of Patterson, 210 Ore. 495, 302 P.2d 227 (1957), Oregon's su-
preme court denied the application of one who had once been a member of the Com-
munist Party due to the applicant's failure to tell the truth "about the real character
and the aims of the Communist Party and his belief in them." Id. at 502, 320 P.2d at
234. The court was impressed with the fact that the applicant was not remorseful for
having once held membership in the Party and only objected mildly to its activities
at the time of the hearing. The United States Supreme Court vacated the case and
remanded it "for consideration in light of Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957)
and Schware v. Board of Exam., 353 U.S. 232 (1957)." 353 U.S. at 952-53 (1957). See
text at notes 29-35, infra, for a discussion of these cases. On remand, the Oregon
supreme court reaffirmed its position, basing its decision on the ground that the appli-
cant testified falsely about the ultimate aims of the Party and that his untruthfulness
indicated a lack of fitness for the practice of law. Application of Patterson, 318 P.2d
907 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 947 (1958). In Martin v. Law Soc'y of British
Columbia, [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173 (Ont. 1950), an applicant was denied admission be-
cause he was a Marxist Communist.
24. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 159
(1961).
25. Application of Capace, 291 A.2d 632 (R.I. 1972).
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Other courts have admitted applicants to the bar despite a his-
tory of mental illness, depression and suicide attempts," conviction
of petty larceny where a full pardon was granted, 7 and conviction of
misdemeanors while participating in civil rights demonstrations.28
In the first Konigsberg case,2" decided in 1957, plaintiff Konigs-
berg refused to answer questions propounded to him by the California
Committee of Bar Examiners relating to his political affiliations,
editorials and beliefs, including inquiries as to whether he was a
member of the Communist Party or whether he associated with mem-
bers of that party. The committee refused to certify him to practice
law on the ground that he had failed to prove (1) that he was of good
moral character, and (2) that he did not advocate the overthrow of
the government of the United States or California by unconstitu-
tional means. Konigsberg petitioned the California supreme court to
review the action of the committee, but that court refused to do so,
and the United States Supreme Court thereupon granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court, with Justice Black as author of the opinion and
three justices dissenting, held that the plaintiff's refusal to answer
the questions did not justify an inference of bad moral character, and
that there was no other evidence in the record which rationally justi-
fied a finding that he had failed to establish his good moral character
or that he advocated the overthrow of the government. Concluding
that Konigsberg had been denied due process under the fourteenth
amendment, the Court reversed the judgment of the California court
and remanded the case.
On the same day the first Konigsberg case was decided, the
United States Supreme Court also rendered judgment in Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners of the State of New Mexico.'" In that case,
the plaintiff had applied for admission to the New Mexico bar in
1953. His application and the evidence showed that Schware had
used certain aliases between 1933 and 1937, that he had been arrested
several times prior to 1940, and that he joined the Young Communist
League in 1932. He subsequently left the Communist Party, but re-
joined it later for a brief period of time. He was arrested and indicted
in 1940 for violation of the Neutrality Act of 1917, but the charges
were later dismissed. His conduct appeared to have been exemplary
after 1940. The New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners denied him the
26. Petition of Schaengold, 422 P.2d 686 (Nev. 1967).
27. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam., 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966).
28. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Exam., 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966).
29. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
30. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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right to take the bar examination, and the action of that Board was
upheld by the state supreme court." After reviewing the case, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the state court judgment and
remanded the case. The Court, with Justice Black authoring the
opinion and the same three justices who dissented in Konigsberg also
dissenting here, held that Schware had been deprived of due process
in denying him the opportunity to qualify for the practice of law.
On remand of the first Konigsberg decision, the California court
referred the matter to the State Committee of Bar Examiners where
additional hearings were held. At those hearings Konigsberg pro-
duced evidence tending to prove his good character, and no evidence
was introduced tending to show the contrary. Konigsberg, however,
persisted in his refusal to answer questions relating to his member-
ship in the Communist Party. The committee again refused to certify
him, this time on the ground that his refusals to answer had "ob-
structed a proper and complete investigation of applicant's qualifica-
tions."32 The California court refused to review the action of the com-
mittee," and the United States Supreme Court again granted certior-
ari.
In the second Konigsberg case,3" decided on April 24, 1961, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the California court by a 5-4
vote. The effect of that decision was to deny Konigsberg's application
for admission to the state bar. The majority opinion was written by
Justice Harlan, with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Doug-
las and Brennan dissenting. The court held that "the Fourteenth
Amendment protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid
a state from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he
refused to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a sub-
stantial relevance to his qualifications."3
On the same day the opinion in the second Konigsberg case was
handed down, the Supreme Court also decided In re Anastaplo,"
which involved substantially the same issues as those presented in
the second Konigsberg case. There, the petitioner, having passed the
Illinois bar examination, was denied admission to the bar of that
state on the ground that he had refused to answer questions relating
to his character and particularly that he had refused to state whether
he was a member of the Communist Party. The United States Su-
31. Schware v. Board of Bar Exam., 60 N.M. 304, 291 P.2d 607 (1955).
32. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 770, 344 P.2d 777, 778 (1959).
33. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959).
34. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
35. Id. at 44.
36. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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preme Court, again by a 5 to 4 decision, with Justice Harlan as author
of the opinion and the same four members dissenting, followed the
ruling in the second Konigsberg case and held that Anastaplo had
obstructed the investigation by the state of his qualifications for ad-
mission to the bar by refusing to answer material questions and that
the action of the state bar committee and the state court in denying
him the right to practice law did not offend any provision of the
Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the action
of the state bar committee.
After the Anastaplo and the second Konigsberg cases were de-
cided, the law seemed settled that a bar examining committee or a
state court had the right to inquire whether an applicant for admis-
sion to the bar was a member of the Communist Party, and that it
could refuse to admit him, without offending the Constitution, if the
applicant refused to answer that question. That law, however, again
became somewhat confused by judgments rendered by the United
States Supreme Court in three cases, all of which were decided on the
same date, February 23, 1971.
In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona," the applicant refused to an-
swer a question as to "whether she had ever been a member of the
Communist Party or any organization 'that advocated overthrow of
the United States government by force or violence'," and the Ari-
zona bar committee thereupon declined to process her application
further or recommend her admission to the bar. The state supreme
court upheld the action of the committee, and the United States
Supreme Court, after reviewing the case, held that the action of the
bar committee violated the first amendment in that it denied the
applicant "freedom of mind" and "the right of association."3 The
Court held that:
[W]hatever justification may be offered, a State may not
inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose
of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes
... . Without detailed reference to all prior cases, it is sufficient
to say we hold that views and beliefs are immune from bar asso-
ciation inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an
applicant from the practice of law. Clearly Arizona has engaged
in such questioning here."40
37. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. Id. at 4-5.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 7.
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The judgment of the state court was reversed and the case was re-
manded.
In Application of Stolar," the applicant, after having obtained a
license to practice in New York state, applied to the Ohio bar for
admission to practice law in that state. He provided the Ohio bar
committee with the answers he had given to questions propounded
by the New York committee, but he refused to answer questions as
to whether he had ever been a member of the Communist Party, of a
Socialist Party or of the Students for a Democratic Society. He also
refused to state whether he had been or presently was a member of
any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government
of the United States by force. The committee denied his application
to take the bar examination, and the Ohio supreme court affirmed
the denial. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the state court and remanded the case. The court held that:
Ohio may not require an applicant for admission to the Bar
to state whether he has been or is a 'member of any organization
which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United
States by force.' . . . [T]he first amendment prohibits Ohio
from penalizing a man solely because he is a member of a particu-
lar organization . . . . Since this is true, we can see no legitimate
state interest which is served by a question which sweeps so
broadly into areas of belief and association protected against gov-
ernment invasion. 42
The majority opinions in Baird and Stolar were authored by Justice
Black, with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Harlan and
White dissenting.
The third case involving similar issues and decided on the same
day as Baird and Stolar was Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc. v. Wadmond13 There, the plaintiffs were organizations
and individuals claiming to represent a class of law students and law
graduates similarly situated who were seeking or were planning to
seek admission to the bar in New York. The Supreme Court, with
Justice Stewart authoring the majority opinion and Justices Black,
Douglas, Marshall and Brennan dissenting, held that state bar exam-
iners could ask applicants about their affiliations with the
Communist Party as a preliminary to further inquiry into the nature
of the association, and they could exclude applicants who refused to
answer.
41. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
42. Id. at 30.
43. 401 U.S. 11 (1971).
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Although the last mentioned series of cases leaves the law unset-
tled, it is logical to assume that state courts and state bar examiners
will be permitted to require an applicant for membership to the bar
to answer questions pertaining to membership in the Communist
Party or in any other organization as a preliminary to further investi-
gation as to whether the applicant advocates or has ever advocated
the violent or forceful overthrow of the government. It seems to the
author that the courts ultimately must hold that mere membership
in an organization which advocates the overthrow of the government
of the United States by force will constitute a sufficient ground, in
itself, to deny an applicant the right to practice law. It is difficult to
understand how the applicant could take an oath to support the
constitution and laws of a state and of the United States while sup-
porting such an organization. The present jurisprudence indicates,
however, that mere membership in an organization of that kind,
alone and without anything more, will not serve as the basis for
preventing the applicant from practicing law.
Three cases have been decided recently by the Louisiana su-
preme court relating to that court's requirement that an applicant for
admission to the bar produce satisfactory evidence that he is of good
moral character. In Moity v. Louisiana State Bar Association," the
court held that an applicant who was denied the right to take the bar
examination because of his failure to produce satisfactory evidence
of good moral character and who complains that the action of the
committee was arbitrary and unreasonable is entitled to a hearing,
at which he will have the right to be represented by counsel, to intro-
duce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses against him. The court
determined that such a hearing should be conducted before a com-
mission appointed by the court, in accordance with the procedures
used in disciplinary and disbarment proceedings set out in the Arti-
cles of Incorporation of the state bar association.
In Ex parte Minor,5 the Louisiana supreme court upheld the
right of the Committee on Bar Admission to require that each appli-
cant execute a "Certificate of Waiver" authorizing the committee to
obtain information about the applicant from other sources. The re-
fusal of the applicant to sign such a waiver may constitute sufficient
grounds for the committee to deny his application.
In the recent case of In re Dileo," the Committee of Bar Examin-
ers denied an applicant the right to take the Louisiana bar examina-
44. 239 La. 1081, 121 So. 2d 87 (1960).
45. 280 So. 2d 217 (La. 1973).
46. 307 So. 2d 362 (La. 1975).
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tion because of his conviction of two criminal offenses in 1970, his
violation and revocation of probation and his subsequent imprison-
ment for several months in a correctional institution. The applicant
was granted a full pardon and restoration of state citizenship in 1972,
and he thereafter maintained an excellent academic record while
attending law school and while working as a part-time law clerk. The
Louisiana supreme court concurred in the committee's denial of the
applicant's admission to the bar, but after noting the applicant's
apparent rehabilitation it held that his conduct did not involve "such
a degree of moral turpitude that it would forever bar him from the
practice of law."' 7 The court authorized the applicant to reapply as
of April 1, 1975, and ordered the committee to certify him as being
morally fit for admission to the bar if he continued to rehabilitate
himself up to that time.
There is no indication from the above cases, or from an examina-
tion of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation, that any of the rules and procedures applied in the state are
vulnerable to attack as being in conflict with the Federal Constitu-
tion.
Residency and Citizenship
Several cases decided by federal courts have considered the va-
lidity of state statutes or court rules which condition the right of an
applicant to practice law or to take the bar examination upon resi-
dence in the state or on citizenship of the state or of the United
States. Most courts in deciding these cases have applied the "rational
connection" test of Schware,8 that "any qualification for admission
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capac-
ity to practice law."'" In several cases, however, it has been held that
the applicant's constitutional rights were violated by residency or
citizenship requirements.
In the case of In re Griffiths,5" the United States Supreme Court
held that the appellant, a resident alien, had been deprived of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment by a rule of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut which provided that only citizens of the United
States could take the bar examination and be admitted to practice
law in that state. The applicant was a citizen of the Netherlands who
married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of
47. Id. at 365.
48. Schware v. Board of Bar Exam., 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
49. Id. at 239.
50. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
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Connecticut. She met all of the qualifications to practice law in Con-
necticut, except the requirement that she be a citizen of this country.
The Court held that since "alienage" was a "suspect classification,"
the state of Connecticut bore a heavy burden of showing that such a
classification was necessary to promote or safeguard its interests, and
that the state had failed to meet that burden. The Court noted that
the applicant's alienage did not prevent her from taking an oath to
support the Constitution of the United States and the State of Con-
necticut, and it observed that if the state had any doubts about her
ability to affirm those oaths in good faith, it could "quite properly
conduct a character investigation"'" to determine whether she is one
who "swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his
(her) disagreement with or indifference to the oath." 2 While recog-
nizing that lawyers are "officers of the court, '" 3 the opinion states
that they nevertheless are not "officials of government,""4 and that
their status of holding a license to practice law does not place them
so close to the core of the political process as to make them formula-
tors of government policies.
The decision rendered in Griffiths invalidates and effectively
removes from the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association the requirement that an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the United States. 55
Several states, by statute or by court rule, provide that an appli-
cant will not be permitted to take the bar examination or to practice
law unless he has resided in the state or county for a specified period
of time.56 The required period of residency varies from state to state,
but in some states at least it runs from six to twelve months.57 Suits
have been filed attacking these requirements on constitutional
grounds, and the jurisprudence is now established that a residency
requirement of twelve months is constitutionally objectionable and
void.58 In making that determination, the courts have applied the
"rational connection" test of Schware, and have held that there was
51. Id. at 726.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 728.
54. Id. at 729.
55. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XIV, § 7(B)(C),
LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app. (Supp. 1971).
56. See, e.g., WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
Rule 1.000 (1973); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 256.28 (1971).
57. See, e.g., HAWAII SuP. CT. R. 15(c) as amended (1970) (six months); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 73-3-13 (1972) (one year), as amended by Miss. Laws 1974, ch. 510, § 1
(bona fide resident).
58. Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W.Va. 1972).
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no such connection between the applicant's residency in the state for
that period of time and his qualification to practice law.
The case of Smith v. Davis," for example, involved the validity
of a West Virginia statute which in effect prohibited the issuance of
a license to practice law to an applicant who had not been a resident
of the county for at least one year. The applicant met all of the
requirements for admission except that of residency, and the state
Board of Law Examiners refused to certify him on that basis. He filed
suit, and a three judge federal court decreed that West Virginia's
residency requirement was unconstitutional and void, being in con-
travention of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.
One member of the three judge court which decided Smith v.
Davis filed a vigorous dissent which reads, in part, as follows:
I take this course on principle, and as a protest to the menac-
ing thrust of the 'new federalism' into every facet of our political
life and the consequent erosion of the powers of local government.
This has been accomplished, in my opinion, under the guise of a
sort of 'freedom for everything for everybody' concept supposedly
reposed in the Constitution. It is this 'free swinging' interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment which virtually renders it a
vehicle for remaking our political order that I cannot embrace.
Subverted also is the constitutional right to freedom of travel
from state to state. I fail to see any infringement of this right by
the statutory requirement in question."
In Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Hawaii,"' the
plaintiff attacked a rule of the Superior Court of Hawaii which pro-
vided that no person shall be examined for or admitted to the practice
of law "unless he has physically resided in Hawaii continuously for a
period of six months after attaining the age of 15 years." 2 Finding no
reasonable basis for a residency requirement of six months which
need not be met immediately prior to filing an application for admis-
sion and which conceivably could be fulfilled several years before
filing, a three judge district court held the residency requirement
invalid.
In Suffling v. Bondurant,"3 however, a rule of the New Mexico
supreme court which required a residency of six months in that state
59. 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W.Va. 1972).
60. Id. at 1230 (Knapp, J. dissenting).
61. 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971).
62. HAWAII SUP. CT. R. 15(c) as amended (1970).
63. 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972).
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before being admitted to practice was held to be reasonable, not
constitutionally objectionable, and valid. The three judge district
court which decided the case reasoned that six months was a reasona-
ble period of time within which to afford the Board of Bar Examiners
an opportunity to investigate the morals and character of the person
seeking to become a member of the bar. The court also justified the
six month residency requirement on the ground that it provided a
reasonable time within which members of the bar in that locality
could observe the applicant and certify as to his moral character, as
required by another rule of the supreme court. The Suffling case was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where the judgment
of the district court was affirmed."4
The jurisprudence indicates that a state may validly require that
an applicant for admission to the bar reside in that state for a short
period of time, perhaps not over six months, before he will be permit-
ted to take the bar examination or before he will be admitted to
practice. The test to be applied in determining the constitutional
validity of such a requirement is to inquire as to whether it has a
"rational connection" with the applicant's fitness or capacity to prac-
tice law. There unquestionably is a rational connection between a
residency requirement and the applicant's fitness in that it gives the
bar admissions committee a better opportunity to observe and to
examine the applicant. The courts have indicated, however, that only
a relatively short period is needed for that purpose, and that a resi-
dency requirement which exceeds the time reasonably required for
such an investigation will be held to be invalid as an infringement of
constitutional rights.
Law School Graduates
Most states, by statute or by court rule, require that an applicant
be a graduate of an accredited law school and that he pass a state
bar examination before he can be licensed to practice law." Courts
universally have upheld the right of the states to impose those re-
quirements." It has been recognized, however, that despite those re-
64. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd sub nor. Rose
v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
65. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XIV, §§
7, 9, LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app. (Supp. 1971); MINN. SuP. CT. R. 111 (5).
66. Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Exam., 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971); Chaney v.
State Bar, 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1968); Hackin v.
Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966); Application
of Saunders, 295 F. Supp. 263 (D.V.I. 1969); Henington v. State Bd. of Bar Exam., 60
N.M. 393, 291 P.2d 1108 (1956); Application of Schatz, 80 Wash. 2d 604, 497 P.2d 153
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quirements courts have the inherent power to admit persons to the
bar who have not taken or passed bar examinations, where it appears
to the court that they are fit and qualified to practice law. 7 A federal
court thus validated a Montana "diploma privilege" which relieved
graduates of the state law school of the necessity of taking a bar
examination required of graduates of other law schools. 8
A case decided by the United States District Court for Colorado
on June 12, 1973,9 involved a Colorado civil procedure rule which
required that every applicant for admission to the bar of that state
be a graduate of a law school approved by the American Bar Associa-
tion. One applicant, Rossiter, was a graduate of a law school which
had not been approved by the American Bar Association, and for that
reason his application for a license to practice law was rejected. He
instituted suit against the Law Committee of the State Board of Law
Examiners of Colorado, alleging that the law school from which he
graduated met the standards required by the ABA, and that he thus
was entitled to be admitted to the bar. The record apparently showed
that the American Bar Association assumes that a law school wishing
accreditation will initiate the steps required to secure it, but that the
law school from which Rossiter graduated had never completed the
process that would enable the ABA to pass on the question of whether
it complied with its standards.
The court held that Colorado's delegation of power to approve
law schools, without providing the applicant with an opportunity to
demonstrate that he had graduated from a school that satisfied the
ABA standards, was a denial of the applicant's right of due process
of law. The court decreed that if the ABA does not adopt procedures
by which the applicant can demonstrate compliance before that asso-
ciation, due process requirements would be satisfied only if the state
provided an alternate procedure by which an applicant could demon-
strate compliance.
Although the judgment rendered in that case was intended to
grant the applicant a remedy, it is questionable whether he would be
able to show that the school he attended actually had met the stan-
dards of the ABA, unless the law school itself voluntarily undertook
(1972).
67. Application of Fink, 109 F. Supp. 729 (D. Alas. 1953), aff'd, 208 F.2d 898 (9th
Cir. 1953).
68. Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D. Mont. 1974),
aff'd, 419 U.S. 455 (1974). See also Shenfield v. Pratner, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss.
1974) (involving a challenge to Mississippi's diploma privilege).
69. Rossiter v. Law Comm. of the State Bd. of Law Exam., 42 U.S.L.W. 1007,1017
(July 10, 1973).
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to complete the process which would enable the ABA to make that
determination. The law school apparently had chosen not to com-
plete that process prior to the institution of the suit.
The Rossiter decision conflicts with or materially modifies the
established rule that a state may require that an applicant be a
graduate of a law school accredited by the American Bar Association
before he can be admitted to practice law. Under the Rossiter rule,
an applicant who voluntarily attended a law school which deliber-
ately declined to seek accreditation would be entitled to a hearing,
either in a state or federal court, at which he would have the oppor-
tunity of showing the ABA standards for a law school and of proving
that the school he attended had complied with those standards. If he
should be successful in making that proof, then presumably, under
the Rossiter rule, judgment would be rendered ordering that he be
admitted to the practice of law, despite the fact that he was not a
graduate of an accredited law school as required by state law or by
court rule.
CODES OF ETHICS
As already noted, the judiciary has the "inherent power" to regu-
late the discipline and disbarment of attorneys, as well as to control
the admission of applicants to the practice of law. The courts in this
country exercised that authority only sparingly, if at all, during the
nineteenth century, and no organized effort had been made by mem-
bers of the bar up to that time to discipline themselves. It perhaps
was due to those circumstances that a rampant commercialism of the
bar developed during the early and middle part of that century. With
the image of the attorneys tarnished, concerned leaders of the bar
recognized the need for formulating some standards of professional
conduct which could serve as a guide to practitioners. To accomplish
that purpose several state bar associations were formed during that
period, and the American Bar Association was organized in 1878.
The first statement of professional standards was drafted and
adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887.1" The Ala-
bama Code of Ethics consisted of several statements of general prin-
ciples, followed by a number of rules of conduct which set out the
duties owed by attorneys to the courts, to judicial officers, to each
other, to clients and to the public. The Alabama Code served as a
model for similar codes which were adopted by other states.7 Some
states drafted codes of ethics consisting of "canons," which contained
70. See DRINKER at 24.
71. Id. at 23.
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general statements of the standards of conduct and the duties and
obligations which attorneys were expected to observe. The Louisiana
State Bar Association adopted a Code of Ethics in 1899 which was
composed of eight canons."2
One of the first undertakings of the American Bar Association
when it was organized in 1878 was to establish uniform requirements
throughout the Union for admission to the bar and for regulating the
standing throughout the Union of gentlemen already admitted to
practice in their own states.73 It did not adopt a code of professional
conduct, however, until several years later.
In 1908, the American Bar Association, drawing upon the codes
of ethics of many states, adopted the "Canons of Professional Eth-
ics," which consisted of thirty-two canons. Many of those canons were
subsequently amended, and more were added from time to time. By
1969, the ABA Code of Ethics contained forty-seven canons, and also
by that time almost all of the states had adopted canons of ethics
which either conformed to or slightly varied from the ABA canons.
The Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in
1908, while setting forth ethical guidelines for attorneys, did not pro-
vide any sanctions for violations of the canons. The courts, however,
often considered those canons in determining whether attorneys
should or should not be disciplined. One court appropriately observed
that:
Codes of Ethics adopted by bar associations, of course, have
no statutory force. They are indicative, however, of and reflect
the attitude of the profession as a whole upon those courses of
action which they frown upon and interdict, and they are com-
monly regarded by bench and bar alike as wholesome standards
of professional ethics. .... 1,
The old Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association was
supplemented by opinions rendered by the association's Committee
on Professional Ethics. Over 1,000 opinions, formal and informal,
were published during the succeeding years. Weaknesses of the old
canons and the opinions which interpreted them, however, were that
they were too general in character, they consisted largely of idealistic
and sometimes vague statements, and they failed to establish definite
or enforceable rules of conduct.
72. Id.
73. 1 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 26 (1878).
74. Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.D.C. 1952). See also DRINKER
at 27.
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The American Bar Association long ago recognized the need for
correcting the weaknesses of the Canons of Ethics, and it undertook
to do so in 1928, 1933, 1937 and 1954, but for various reasons little
was accomplished on those occasions. Finally, in 1964, under the
leadership of President Lewis F. Powell, Jr., now Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, the association appointed a "Spe-
cial Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards" to examine the
existing Canons of Professional Ethics and to make recommendations
for changes. That committee submitted its final draft and recommen-
dations on July 1, 1969, and the code recommended by the committee
was adopted by the American Bar Association that year, to become
effective in January, 1970. The revision of the old Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics and the adoption of new and more effective rules of
conduct in 1969 may have been prompted by the same circumstances
which induced the American Bar Association to appoint a Special
Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement in 1967, under
the chairmanship of former Justice Tom C. Clark.
The new ABA Code of Professional Responsibility is divided into
separate but interrelated (1) Canons, (2) Ethical Considerations, and
(3) Disciplinary Rules." The Canons are "statements of axiomatic
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional con-
duct expected of lawyers in their relationship with the public, with
the legal system and with the legal profession.""6 The number of
canons has been reduced from forty-seven to nine. Ethical Considera-
tions are "aspirational in character," and they represent "the objec-
tives toward which every member of the profession should strive.""
The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character. They "state the
minimal level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action." 8
The most important feature of the new Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility is its inclusion of disciplinary rules which are enforcea-
ble. The violation of a disciplinary rule is a ground for disciplinary
action against or perhaps suspension or disbarment of the violating
attorney, although the Code itself does not provide procedures or
penalties for those violations."
75. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
(1969).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. See R.L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WISE].
79. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (1969).
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The new Code of Professional Responsibility is a substantial
improvement over the old canons, in that it affords attorneys ade-
quate notice of the type of conduct which is prohibited. The United
States Supreme Court has held that actions to disbar attorneys are
quasi-criminal in nature, and that disbarment proceedings are sub-
ject to the due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment.80
One writer, in discussing the effect of the 1970 Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility said:
The new Code, therefore, while carrying forward the sound
principles in the old canons, transmuted them into inspirational
ethical considerations, forming the basis for disciplinary rules
which state clearly the obligations which a lawyer must fulfill and
the proscriptions he must not disobey, without suffering the con-
sequence of disciplinary action. Further, the considerations and
the rules, taken together, form the foundation for clear instruc-
tion of the beginning practitioner."!
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has been adopted,
either verbatim or with minimal changes, by most of the states of the
union. It was adopted in Louisiana in April, 1970, to be effective on
July 1 of that year. Louisiana thus was one of the early states to adopt
the new Code.
Since the adoption of the new Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, a number of attorneys have been disciplined for various reasons,
but primarily for the incompetent or improper handling of the affairs
of clients and for the commingling or misappropriation of the client's
funds. 2 Some states have tried to correct the problem of incompetent
80. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), where the court cited In re Ruffalo for the
principle that persons who practice professions are entitled to procedural due process
before professional disciplinary sanctions may be imposed. See also, Goodrich v. Su-
preme Court of the State of South Dakota, 511 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1975), indicating that
state disbarment proceedings are "quasi-criminal in nature." 511 F.2d at 318 n.4.
81. WISE at 8.
82. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Levy, 292 So. 2d 492 (La. 1974) (mishandling
funds); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Selenberg, 264 La. 151, 270 So. 2d 848 (1973)
(misuse of funds); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Powell, 248 La. 237, 178 So. 2d 235
(1965) (commingling funds). See also Yokozeki v. State Bar, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602, 521
P.2d 858 (1974) (misappropriation of funds); People v. Roberts, 520 P.2d 133 (Colo.
1974) (neglect of duties, commingling of client's funds and failure to account for funds
received); In re Brunt, 308 N.E.2d 391 (Ind. 1974) (neglect of client's affairs after
acceptance of fee); State v. Martindale, 215 Kan. 667, 527 P.2d 703 (1974) (neglect to
complete contract of professional employment and failure to diligently pursue client's
claims).
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legal services by arranging and encouraging members of the bar to
participate in continuing legal education courses and programs.u
Such programs for the most part, however, are not mandatory, and
it is questionable as to whether they reach the lawyers who need them
the most. The bar has become acutely aware of the fact that the
publicity which follows the misappropriation of funds by a lawyer
severely damages the profession as a whole. That damage has been
mitigated somewhat by the creation of client security funds in some
jurisdictions, built up by contributions from members of the state
and local bar associations." Unfortunately, the amount on hand in
these security funds is sometimes not sufficient to cover the losses
sustained by the victimized clients.
Reporting Attorney Misconduct
One of the problems specifically listed by the ABA Special Com-
mittee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement headed by Justice
Clark was the "reluctance on the part of lawyers and judges to report
instances of professional misconduct." 5 The report states that al-
though lawyers and judges have knowledge of misconduct on the part
of attorneys, relatively few complaints are submitted to disciplinary
agencies by members of the profession, and that "[tihis fact has
been cited as a major problem by nearly every disciplinary agency in
the United States surveyed by this committee." ' The committee
recommended, among other things, that there be "sanctions, in ap-
propriate circumstances, against attorneys and judges who fail to
report attorney misconduct of which they are aware." 87
Addressing itself to that problem, the drafters of the present
Code of Professional Responsibility began the Code with a require-
ment that lawyers possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation
of any disciplinary rule by another attorney shall report that knowl-
edge to the proper authorities and that failure to make such a report
83. As of early this year, the courts and bar associations of several states were
considering or were on the verge of implementing compulsory continuing legal educa-
tion programs. Included among these states are Iowa, Minnesota, Washington, New
Mexico, Kansas and Oregon. See 19 AM. BAR NEWS 3 (Nov. 1974).
84. Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, CASE &'COMMENT 51-52 (May-June
1971); Voorhies, The Case of the Client's Security Fund, J. OF AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y
(Feb. 1959). Recently, the states of Kentucky, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have
taken steps to improve their client security programs. See 19 AM. BAR NEWS 3 (Nov.
1974).
85. 95 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR Ass'N 963 (1970).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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is in itself a violation of the disciplinary rules. Canon 1 of the new
Code provides that "A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integ-
rity and competency of the legal profession." Ethical Consideration
1-4 stipulates that "A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those offi-
cials all unprivileged knowledge of conduct of lawyers which he be-
lieves clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules." Discipli-
nary Rule 1-102 states simply that "a lawyer shall not violate a
Disciplinary Rule." Finally, Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) provides that
"A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-
102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority em-
powered to investigate or act upon such violation."
The substance of Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) was contained in
Canon 29 of the original ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which
provided in part:
Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the pro-
per tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and
should accept without hesitation employment against a member
of the Bar who has wronged his client. ...
One significant difference between original Canon 29 and DR 1-
103(A) is that the former was not enforceable, while the new Discipli-
nary Rule can be enforced by disciplinary action.
Most attorneys will agree with the Clark Committee that one of
the major problems in attempting to maintain high ethical standards
in the bar is the failure of lawyers and judges to report known viola-
tions by other lawyers. The solution to that problem, however, is very
difficult.
The Clark Committee reported that if individual attorneys and
judges shirk their responsibility to report violations and permit
wrongdoers to escape disciplinary action, the public may conclude
that "self policing" is in reality "self protection."8 It noted several
undesirable results which may flow from the failure of judges and
attorneys to report violations of disciplinary rules by other members
of the bar. Some of them are: (1) a client who retains an unethical
practitioner may form his opinion of the entire profession from a
single experience, but if other attorneys report the misconduct, the
client's respect for the integrity of the bar may be restored; (2) if
attorneys who are aware of the misconduct of their colleagues do not
report it, the client may conclude that the bar is engaged in a conspir-
acy to protect "its own;" (3) the attorney who fails to report a known
violation by another attorney may subject future clients of the uneth-
88. Id. at 964.
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ical practitioner to serious harm, including the misappropriation of
funds.89
An informal opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Responsibility indicates that an attorney who is a member of a
State Board of Professional Responsibility has the duty under DR 1-
103(A) to report unprivileged knowledge of violations of DR 1-102 to
the proper authority. 0 Similarly, the provisions of DR 1-103(A) were
judicially recognized in Estates Theaters, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc.," where a federal district court stated:
When the propriety of professional conduct is questioned,
any member of the Bar who is aware of the facts which give rise
to the issue is duty bound to present the matter to the proper
forum, and a tribunal to whose attention an alleged violation is
brought is similarly duty bound to determine if there is any merit
to the charge. The issue having arisen here on plaintiff's motion,
those attorneys representing other parties to the litigation were
obligated to report the relevant facts to the Court for its determi-
nation. Indeed, the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
such action.9 2
Although DR 1-103(A) was designed and adopted to serve a
badly needed purpose, some questions have been raised as to whether
it will serve that purpose and, even if it will, whether it is a desirable
method of obtaining information as to the misconduct of members of
the bar. For example, one writer interprets DR 1-103(A) as a require-
ment that lawyers "spy" on each other. He refers to the rule as the
first "Gestapo" informer system which has been adopted in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, and he inquires whether it is a violation for
Attorney A to fail to report that Attorney B failed to inform on Attor-
ney C.13 This last inquiry obviously was made facetiously, but it
nevertheless suggests some problems which may be encountered in
enforcing that particular disciplinary rule.
It has also been suggested that because of DR 1-103(A) the bar
officials who endeavor to enforce any other Disciplinary Rule may
encounter problems in obtaining the evidence they need. A lawyer,
for instance, may be reluctant to testify in a disciplinary or disbar-
89. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 220-21 (Pre-
liminary Draft 1970).
90. ABA Informal Opinion No. 1210.
91. 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
92. Id. at 98.
93. Brown, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, In Defense of Mediocrity,
TRIAL 29, 30 (July-Aug. 1970).
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ment proceeding unless he previously had reported the misconduct
to proper authorities. If he had not, then the disclosure of his failure
to do so may subject him to disciplinary action.
There is no question that all members of the legal profession
suffer because of the misconduct of a few, and that there is an urgent
need to discipline the offenders. It also appears from the Clark Com-
mittee report that lawyers and judges, who are in the best position
to know of violations, are understandably reluctant to report them.
Some means must be devised by which the offending lawyers can be
reported and in proper cases subjected to disciplinary action.
It is suggested that Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A), which was de-
signed to help solve that problem, is not the answer. Although no
specific procedure can be suggested here, the problem is of sufficient
magnitude that further studies of it should be made, preferably under
the direction of the American Bar Association and of various state bar
associations. Also, in view of the inherent power of the court to regu-
late the practice of law, it would be appropriate for the judiciary to
join in such a study. With those studies and perhaps the trial of
different suggested procedures, a solution to this perplexing problem
may be found.
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